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Eliminating Poverty, the 
Swedish Way 
Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Sweden has a remarkably  egalitarian  distribution of  income and low rate of 
poverty. The living standards of the poor are closer to those of median citizens 
than in other advanced countries. Until the  1992-93  rise in joblessness, Swe- 
den combined a narrow  distribution  of earnings and skill differentials with 
high employment. Wage differentials rose in Sweden when centralized bar- 
gaining weakened in the 1980s, and joblessness jumped in 1992, but the coun- 
try maintained a low rate of poverty and avoided the growth of an underclass 
and the homelessness that developed in the United States and the United King- 
dom. Indeed, so successful has been Sweden’s “war on poverty” that the statis- 
tical concept of a poverty rate is not part of Swedish public discussion. 
What explains Sweden’s egalitarian income distribution and success in elim- 
inating poverty? What enabled the country to pay high wages to people in the 
lower parts of the earnings distribution without generating a mass loss of jobs? 
How will changes in the welfare state and the 1992-93 economic and financial 
crisis affect distributional outcomes? Can Sweden maintain its record of gener- 
ating equality and eliminating poverty into the twenty-first century? 
This paper examines these questions. Section  1.1 documents the distribu- 
tional record of Sweden relative to those of other advanced countries. To deter- 
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mine whether Sweden’s distributional record comes from a homogeneous pop- 
ulation  or the  system of  income  determination,  section  1.2 examines  how 
people of  Swedish descent fare in the relatively unregulated American  labor 
market and how people of non-Swedish descent fare in Sweden. Sections 1.3 
and 1.4 explore supply-side and demand-side factors that potentially enabled 
Sweden to combine high employment and a narrow earnings distribution. Sec- 
tion  1.5 considers the potential consequences of  market-oriented reforms in 
the welfare state for Sweden’s elimination of poverty. 
Although a large proportion of the welfare state budget goes to pensioners, 
we consider only the nonpensioner population, working-age  adults and chil- 
dren. One reason we do this is that most advanced countries have greatly re- 
duced poverty among the elderly and that Swedish outcomes here are therefore 
not so distinct, although in fact reduction in poverty among the elderly in Swe- 
den exceeds that in  most  other countries  (Coder, Rainwater,  and  Smeeding 
1989; Kangas and Palme 1993). A second reason is that an analysis of how the 
Swedish welfare state treats pensioners would lead us into complicated issues 
regarding the effect of state-funded pensions on savings rates, life-cycle alloca- 
tions of time and income, intergenerational accounting, and so on that would 
greatly extend our investigation. 
We reach six major conclusions: 
1. Sweden achieved its egalitarian income distribution and eliminated pov- 
erty largely because of  its system of earnings and income determination. In 
support of  this conclusion, we note that the narrow income distribution in Swe- 
den cannot be attributed to an exceptionally homogeneous population: the de- 
scendants of Swedes in the United States exhibit as much inequality and pov- 
erty as do other Americans, while people of  foreign ancestry in Sweden have 
an income distribution comparable to those of Swedish parentage. The narrow 
income distribution also cannot be attributed to an exceptionally low return to 
skills due to market forces:  Sweden has a less-educated workforce  than the 
United States, which, all else the same, should have yielded high returns to 
labor skills, contrary to fact. By contrast, changes in earnings inequality in 
Sweden over time mirror changes in wage-setting policies, and taxes and trans- 
fers massively affect the income distribution. While a market-driven system of 
wage and income determination might not produce as much inequality in Swe- 
den as in the United States, the high level of inequality found among people 
of Swedish descent in the United States suggests that the increase in inequality 
would be considerable. 
2.  Sweden’s distinct record of labor outcomes has historically gone beyond 
compression of earnings differentials. Compared to other advanced European 
countries, what was unusual, prior to the 1992 recession, was not Sweden’s low 
inequality in earnings but its high rate of employment. Compared to the United 
States, another high-employment-rate country, Sweden is distinguished by a 
relatively egalitarian distribution of hours of  work among those employed as 
well as by  a compressed wage structure. Indeed, the egalitarian  distribution 
of  hours of  work-work  sharing of  sorts-contributes  as much to Sweden’s 35  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
egalitarian earnings distribution as does its compressed distribution of hourly 
pay. The association of relatively egalitarian distributions of wages and hours 
of work may be interrelated and necessary components of the traditional Swed- 
ish economic system. 
3. Tax and transfer policies contribute substantially to Sweden’s overall dis- 
tribution  record. Factor income inequality is much greater than earnings in- 
equality because  some people  are out of the job market, capital income is 
unequally distributed, and Sweden’s income maintenance system gives consid- 
erable financial support to those who have worked but are currently not work- 
ing or not working full-time. In contrast to many social welfare systems, Swe- 
den’s  is  largely  a  workfare  system, with  few  poverty  trap programs:  most 
welfare  state programs  encourage work. This contrasts with American pro- 
grams, which face the great difficulty of making work pay more than welfare 
for those eligible for benefits. In the  1980s, taxes and transfers largely offset 
trends toward greater inequality in factor incomes. 
4.  Policies and practices that equalize opportunities appear to be less im- 
portant in producing Sweden’s egalitarian earnings distribution than many ob- 
servers would like to believe. The dispersion of years of  schooling is greater 
in Sweden than in the United States. On standardized international tests, the 
distribution of scores for young Swedes is similar to the distribution of scores 
for young people in other advanced societies, although more compressed than 
in the United States, an outlier in inequality in this respect. The greater equal- 
ity of parental incomes in Sweden than in the United States contributes mod- 
estly to the overall greater equality of incomes in Sweden. The implication is 
that policies that tend to equalize opportunities for the young do not explain 
much of Sweden’s exceptional distribution record. 
5. Part of Sweden’s historic success in maintaining jobs for low-wage work- 
ers while raising their wages resulted from policies that directly or indirectly 
buttress the demand for low-skill workers. One important factor was the expan- 
sion of public sector employment. While the public sector does not hire dispro- 
portionate numbers of low-skill workers, it greatly increased its share of such 
workers from 1968 to 199  1. Another mode of buttressing demand for low-skill 
workers has been public subsidization of employment for the 2 percent or so 
of the population  that is counted as disabled. We also note that Sweden pays 
for or subsidizes indirectly the high wages of less-skilled workers through high 
prices in nontraded goods and services in the private sector as well as in the 
public sector. Reforms that reduce those prices should put downward pressure 
on the wages of low-paid workers. More speculatively, we direct attention to 
the possible link between the compressed distribution of  hours worked  and 
the demand for low-wage labor. In some situations, mandated vacation time, 
extensive payment for time not worked such as parental leave, and high income 
taxes that discourage additional work will create demand for additional em- 
ployment.  Reforms that induce some Swedes, say, the more skilled, to work 
additional hours may reduce demand for labor for others. 
6.  Changes in the 1980s and early 1990s toward a more market-driven econ- 36  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
omy raised inequality modestly but maintained the relative disposable income 
of low-income families with children. While the 1990s Swedish economic cri- 
sis put great strain on government budgets and the welfare system, Sweden’s 
social safety net is so high that ongoing and potential future changes are un- 
likely to threaten its successful elimination of poverty. The child benefits pro- 
gram, in particular, offers a fruitful tool to offset the effects of increased in- 
equality in factor incomes on children. 
1.1  The Swedish Record 
The Welfare State system (is) a major achievement of  modem civilization 
. . . (it has) mitigated, or even eliminated destitution among people with ex- 
tremely low lifetime income. 
-Lindbeck  (1992: 115,97) 
The basic fact about the Swedish income distribution that makes fans of 
such disparate social scientists as Assar Lindbeck and Walter Korpi is that 
income is more narrowly distributed and poverty lower in Sweden than in most 
other countries. Figure 1.1 documents the low inequality in Sweden using data 
based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The figure measures inequality 
by the ratio of household disposable income adjusted for family size’ of those 
in the top decile of the income distribution to those in the bottom decile. Swe- 
den, Finland, and Belgium have the lowest inequality in household incomes.z 
The United States has the highest inequality. 
What lies behind Sweden’s relatively egalitarian distribution of incomes and 
correspondingly high living standards for those in the bottom rungs of the dis- 
tribution? Disposable income per person can be decomposed in various ways 
to lay bare the anatomy of the income distribution. Wages, hours worked, fam- 
ily composition, taxes, and transfers all affect disposable income. Since labor 
earnings are the prime source of personal incomes, it is natural to begin with 
the distribution of wages and hours worked. 
1.1.1  Wages and Work 
Table 1.1 summarizes the distributions of hourly earnings and annual earn- 
ings in Sweden from the Level of Living Survey (Levnadsnivhndersoking- 
arna [LNU]) a panel study of individuals conducted in Sweden3  in 1968, 1974, 
1981, and 1991 in terms of two statistics: the ratio of the earnings of the nineti- 
1. The equivalence scale used in this figure is the square root of  household size. Alternative 
adjustments for household size, such as taking incomes per capita, give a similar picture (see 
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995, table 4.1). 
2. Two important countries missing from these data are Germany and Japan. World Bank data 
on income distribution (not adjusted for family size or for disposable income) show that Japan has 
the lowest inequality among advanced countries while Germany is the fifth lowest in inequality 
(see World Bank 1993, table 10). 
3.  The first survey was conducted in 1968 when approximately six thousand randomly selected 
Swedes were interviewed about their level of living and labor market experiences. Later, in 1974, 37  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
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Fig. 1.1 
Source; Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995). 
Note: Top decile to bottom decile of  household disposable income adjusted for household size. 
Country abbreviations are as follows: AS  = Australia, AU  = Austria, BE = Belgium, CA = 
Canada, DK = Denmark, FL = Finland, FR = France, GE = Germany, IR = Ireland, IT = Italy, 
JP = Japan, LX = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NW = Norway, NZ = New Zealand, PT = 
Portugal, SW = Sweden, SZ = Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. 
Household income equality in OECD economies, mid-1980s 
eth percentile worker to the tenth percentile worker and the ratio of the earn- 
ings of  the tenth percentile worker to the median earnings. The 90/10 ratio 
measures the overall spread of the earnings distribution: it is our indicator of 
overall inequality. The 10/50 ratio measures how close the lower paid are to 
the median: it is our indicator of the earnings gap for the least productive and 
thus of relative poverty. 
The distribution of hourly earnings in Sweden shown in the table is narrow 
by American standards. The 90/10 hourly earnings ratio for men in 1991 of 
2.03 is roughly one-third the 90/10 ratio found in 1989 for the United States 
in the Current Population Survey (5.63)!  The 10/50 ratio of 0.76 contrasts with 
a 0.38 ratio for the United States reported in OECD (1993). While the distribu- 
tion of annual earnings in Sweden is considerably wider than the distribution 
of hourly earnings, this distribution is also narrow compared to the United 
States. The 90/10 differential in annual earnings for men of  3.09 in Sweden 
1981, and 1991, the same sample, complemented with immigrants and youths to make it represen- 
tative of the whole population, was interviewed again. For further details, see Erikson and Aberg 
(1987). The hourly earnings variable in the LNU is constructed from questions about payment per 
period and about working hours. The respondent is asked in what way he or she is paid: by hour, 
by  piece rate, by  week, by  month, etc. Then the survey asks for pay per hour, week, or month. 
Those paid by piece rate report pay per month. The hourly wage of people not paid on an hourly 
basis is computed by dividing monthly (or other unit) pay by normal working hours. 38  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1.1  The Ratio of Hourly and Annual Earnings by Decile, Employed 
Wage and Salary Workers Aged Twenty to Sixty-Four in Sweden, 
1968-91 
Men  Women 
Inequality,  Low Paid,  Inequality,  Low Paid, 
N  90/10  10/50  N  90/ 10  10/50 
Hourly Earnings 
1968  1,709  2.44  .7 1  1,072  2.21  .73 
1974  1,651  2.01  .78  1,254  1.87  .75 
1981  1,750  1.93  .79  1,591  1.65  .81 
1991  1,626  2.03  .76  1,614  1.73  30 
Annual Earnings (including sickness and unemployment insurance) 
1980  1,827  2.66  .59 
1990  1,346  3.09  .5  1 
Source: Tabulated from the Level of Living Surveys (Levnadsniv&ndersokningen) 
Note: We explain hourly earnings in n. 3 to the text. We take annual earnings from register infor- 
mation. We restrict the sample to people who report some earnings in both cases. 
contrasts to a 10.0 differential in the United States, and the 10/50 differential of 
0.51 is more than twice that in the United States (as we shall see in table 1.5).4 
Contrasting  the  Swedish  and American  earnings distributions  can give a 
misleading picture of where Sweden’s distribution fits relative to those of other 
advanced countries. This is because, as figure 1.1 suggests, the United States 
is an outlier in distributional outcomes, with extraordinarily high inequality 
(Freeman 1994; OECD 1993). In fact, Sweden’s earnings distribution is only 
modestly more compressed than the distribution in most OECD countries (see 
fig. 1.2). The 90/10 spread of  inequality is lower in Sweden than elsewhere, 
but the  10/50 ratio in  Sweden is comparable to those for several European 
countries,  such as the Netherlands,  Italy, and Belgium, and is only slightly 
greater than for Germany or Denmark. The compression of earnings in Sweden 
is not as extraordinary as some analyses might lead one to believe (Flanagan 
1987). Rather, what was extraordinary, at least until the rise of unemployment 
in 1992-93,  is that Sweden combined low inequality with high levels of em- 
ployment. 
Figure  1.3 shows how Sweden and other advanced OECD countries stack 
up in these two dimensions of labor market performance. The x axis gives the 
10/50 earnings  ratio.  The y  axis gives  the employrnentlpopulation rate  for 
adults aged 15-64.  Sweden lies at the far right in inequality  and at the top 
4. Since hourly earnings in Sweden are directly measured, while they are obtained in the United 
States by  dividing earnings by  time worked, some of the greater inequality in hourly pay in the 
United States could be due to measurement error. The annual eamings figures show that the basic 
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Fig. 1.2  Spreads of hourly earnings distributions  among male workers, 1990. a, 
Inequality: 90/10 percentiles. b, Low paid: 10/50 percentiles. 
Source: OECD (1993, table 5.2). 
Note; For country abbreviations, see fig. 1.1 note. All data are for 1990 except: United States, 
1989; Norway, 1987; Portugal, 1989; Italy, 1987; Sweden, 1988. All data relate to hourly earnings 
(the Netherlands gives annual figures for 1990; we have adjusted them slightly to be on a weekly 
basis using 1985 weekly and annual figures in OECD 11993, table 5.21). For Denmark, Norway, 
and Portugal, the figures refer to both sexes rather than to men only. The French data adjust the 
provisional figures to a definitive data basis by taking the ratio of provisional updates to definitive 
data in the years in which both are reported and applying this to the 1990 data. Belgium data for 
men give the data for the 80/10 differential ratio but give data for a 90/10 and an 80/10 differential 
for both sexes. We adjusted the 80/10 ratio for men by  multiplying it by the ratio of the 90/10 to 
the 80/10 differential for both sexes. The figures differ slightly from those in Bjorklund and Free- 
man (1994), which used preliminary OECD estimates. 40  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
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Average for the Period 1980-1990 of the Earnings of the Bottom 10th Decile to Median 
Fig. 1.3  Earnings inequality and employment rates 
Notes: For country abbreviations, see fig.  1.1 note. Average of  deciles from OECD (1993, table 
5.2), calculated with different numbers of years for the period 1980-90 depending on numbers of 
observations available per country. Figures are for male workers, except for Denmark, Norway, 
and Portugal, where they refer to both sexes. All data relate to hourly earnings, except the Nether- 
lands, which gives annual figures. For the French data, we adjusted the provisional figures to a 
definitive data basis by  taking the ratio of  provisional updates to definitive data in the years in 
which both are reported and applying this to the 1988-90  data. Employment/population rates are 
taken from OECD (1991, table 2-14). 
in employmentlpopulation rate. By contrast, several low-inequality European 
countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, had low em- 
ployment rates. Some of the differences in the figure reflect differences in fe- 
male labor force participation associated with the locus of “household produc- 
tion” activities (German and Dutch women produce comparable goods in the 
house as Swedish women produce in the public sector). Others can be traced 
to differences in the distribution of hours worked, to be described shortly. But 
comparisons of male inequality and participation show a similar pattern, with 
Sweden characterized by high employment and low inequality. 
Wage dispersion in Sweden has changed over time. The figures in table 1.1 
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with wage-setting policies in the period. This was the era of “solidaristic wage 
policy,” when the negotiated pay settlements reduced differentials along virtu- 
ally all dimensions. By contrast, inequality widened from  1981 to  1991, as 
wage bargaining became increasingly decentralized. Hibbs  (1990) reports a 
similar pattern  for  blue-collar  LO  (the  Swedish Trade  Union  Association) 
workers: falling inequality from 1970 through the early 1980s, followed by an 
increase in inequality. The decline in the 90/10 spread from 2.44 to 1.93 in the 
table is substantial, but what most impresses us is the moderate change in the 
10/50 gap in both  the  1970s period of  decreasing inequality and the  1980s 
period of increasing inequality. In 1968, before the push for equalization, low- 
decile Swedish earners had 71 percent of median hourly earnings; in 1981, at 
the peak of solidaristic wage policies, these workers earned 79 percent of the 
median; in 1991, with more decentralized wage setting, they had 76 percent of 
median earnings. 
1.1.2  Distribution of Hours Worked 
Consider two economies with the same structure of wages. In economy  1, 
high-wage workers work many hours, while low-wage workers work few hours 
(possibly owing to substitution effects in labor supply behavior). In economy 
2, high- and low-wage workers work the same hours over the year. Inequality 
of annual earnings in economy  1 will be greater than in economy 2 because 
the distribution of hours worked is unequal and correlated with hourly wages.5 
These considerations raise the following question:  does the distribution  of 
hours worked among Swedes contribute to the country’s low level of inequality 
in annual earnings? 
Table 1.2 summarizes data on hours worked in Sweden and in the United 
States. The top part of the table gives the division of hours worked in the econ- 
omy by employment status. Row 1  shows that hours worked per adult are mod- 
erately less in Sweden than in the United States: a gap of 0.10 In points. Row 
2 shows that, while both countries have high employment/population  rates, the 
Swedish employment rate exceeded the American rate by 0.08 In points. Hours 
worked per adult are higher in the United States, not because more Americans 
than  Swedes work over the year, but because those who work put in more 
hours. The differential in hours worked for workers is a huge 0.19 In points. 
One important reason for this differential is that Swedes take at least five to 
six weeks vacation time (legally, as of 1993, each person has the right to five 
weeks, plus many public holidays) while Americans take two weeks-a  three- 
to four-week difference that creates a .06-.08-ln-point  difference in annual 
5.  We  avoid the term living standards here because of conceptual issues about how to value 
nonwork time. In one sense, measured income overstates the advantage of those who work more 
hours since they have less leisure. If  their productivity in nonmarket activities exceeds that of 
lower-paid workers proportionate to wage differences, the right comparison is the comparison of 
wages. But,  if those who work few hours do so because their opportunities are, for whatever 
reason, limited, the income comparison may give a better fix on differences in living standards. 42  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1.2  Comparison of Work Time in Sweden and the United States 
Sweden  United States  Ln Difference 
Aggregate work time (men and women) 
1. Aggregate hours worked 
2. Employment/population, 15-64,  in 
3. Hours worked by workers in  1990 
population 
1990 
1.23 1  1,365 
332  ,766 
1,480  1,782 
Sweden 
Both  Men  U.S. Men 
Distribution of annual hours paid for 
(hours > 0) 
4.  90th percentile in hours 
5.  Median in hours 
6.  loth percentile in hours 
7.90/10  spread in hours 
8. 10150 gap in hours 
2,440  2,600  2,912 
2,080  2,080  2,080 
1,010  1,070  960 
2.42  2.43  3.03 







-  .60 
.05 
Difference 
Decomposition of annual earnings inequality 
9.  Variance In annual earnings  ,286  ,233  1.084 
10.  Variance In hours  ,162  .lo7  A72 
1  I. Variance In wage  ,082  .09  1  ,481 
12.  2  covariance In  hours and In wage  ,042  .034  .131 
-  .85 1 
-  ,365 
-  ,390 
-  .097 
Source: Row  1 is calculated from rows 2  and 3.  Row 2  is taken from OECD (1993)  and row 3 
from OECD (1991).  Rows 4-12,  for men and women twenty to sixty-four years old, are tabulated 
from the Level of Living Surveys for Sweden and from the 1990  census for the United States. 
Note: The U.S. data on annual earnings inequality are from self-reported data, with considerable 
potential for error. In rows 4-12,  we have eliminated men reporting less than $1.00 per hour or 
more than $1,000  per hour for the United States as these outliers affect variances but do not 
noticeably affect the percentiles. 
hours worked. Whatever the cause, rows 1-3  show that work hours are distrib- 
uted more equally among adults in Sweden than in the United States. 
The second part of the table gives the distribution of annual hours worked 
among those with positive hours. The data here are hours paid for rather than 
hours worked and thus exceed the hours in the first part of  the table. Column 
1 gives data for men and women in Sweden; columns 2 and 3 contrast men in 
Sweden with  men  in the  United  States. The decile ratios  show  that hours 
worked are more equally distributed in Sweden than in the United States. The 
90/10 spread in hours is 2.42 for both sexes and 2.43 for men in Sweden, which 
compares with 3.03 in the United States. 
The final part of the table decomposes the variance of In annual earnings in 
each country into the part due to the variance in In hourly pay, the part due to 
the variance in hours worked, and twice their covariance. The surprising fact 43  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
that emerges is that the difference in the variance of annual earnings between 
men in Sweden and men in the United States is due as much to the variance in 
annual hours as it is to the variance in In hourly pay. The implication is that 
there is more to the story of equalization in Sweden than compression of wage 
differentials:  the  high  proportion  employed  and  the  distribution  of  hours 
among those working contributed substantially to the relatively egalitarian dis- 
tribution of earnings. 
1.1.3  Household and Disposable Incomes 
Relative equalization of labor market incomes is only part of the Swedish 
income distribution story. The income available to individuals for consumption 
depends on taxes and transfers, family structure, numbers of earners and chil- 
dren, and the like. Sweden’s welfare state tax and transfer policies greatly affect 
the extent to which inequality in market earnings is transformed into inequality 
in disposable incomes. 
Table 1.3 presents information on the distribution of factor incomes: labor 
earnings and capital market earnings; and disposable incomes, which depend 
on taxes and transfers as well, for the nonelderly from 1967 through  1992. We 
have derived these statistics from data on household incomes and people in 
households  as  follows:  we  calculate  incomes  per  equivalent  person  using 
Swedish equivalence scales;6 allocate the same income to each individual in 
the family; and then measure inequality among individuals of  a given type, 
adults or ~hildren.~  In this way, we give the same weight to every person irre- 
spective of the size of the family: a family with four people, for instance, gives 
four observations for the income distribution. Some may question the use of 
equivalence scales in income distribution measurement for adults because the 
adults choose the number of children, which enters their utility function. This 
is a valid point for adults but not for children, who do not make these choices. 
In any case, we have used equivalence scales for both adults and children. 
We place greater stress on inequality and relative poverty among children 
than among adults because the welfare state presumably has a more justifiable 
role to play in the well-being of children.  Some adults will have a low eco- 
nomic  standard owing to their choice of hours and effort of  work and will 
reduce hours and effort the greater the welfare benefits. Children, by contrast, 
create no such moral hazard problem. To the extent that low incomes during 
childhood adversely affect the formation of human capital, moreover, relative 
6.  In these scales, the first adult is counted as 1.0,  the second adult as 0.65, children up to three 
years as 0.48, children between four and ten as 0.57; and children between eleven and seventeen 
as 0.65. The scales used in fig. 1.1 above are different, and therefore the numbers are not the same. 
7. Our definitions offactor income and disposable income include realized capital gains but do 
not capture unrealized gains, e.g., from changing real estate prices. The strongly fluctuating house 
prices-rising  during the 1970s and the second half of the  1980s and falling during 1990-93- 
are therefore not taken fully into account in our data. We believe that this problem is largely in the 
upper half of the income distribution and thus are more confident about our relative poverty rate 
than our measure of overall income inequality. 44  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1.3  Inequality and Relative Poverty in Household Factor Income (FI) 
and Disposable Income (DI) per Equivalent Person in Sweden, 
1967-91 
Inequality: 90/10 Ratios  Relative Poverty: 10/50 Ratios 
Adults (20-64)  Children (0-17)  Adults (20-64)  Children (0-17) 




















5.80  3.19  3.72  2.52  .35  .54  .50  .65 
6.87  2.57  4.24  2.21  .27  .59  .43  .67 
7.87  2.36  4.03  2.14  .23  .62  .44  .67 
8.11  2.65  4.36  2.43  .23  .57  .42  .62 
8.19  2.44  4.87  2.27  .22  .60  .37  .65 
8.24  2.41  4.47  2.18  .22  .61  .40  .67 
8.16  2.44  4.38  2.17  .23  .61  .40  .67 
7.82  2.45  4.71  2.09  .23  .6 1  .37  .68 
8.14  2.41  4.49  2.10  .23  .62  .38  .68 
8.72  2.44  4.39  2.07  .2 1  .63  .39  .68 
9.24  2.49  4.82  2.08  .2 1  .62  .36  .68 
8.83  2.38  4.78  2.00  .2  1  .63  .37  .70 
9.57  2.39  4.79  2.02  .20  .63  .36  .69 
9.46  2.41  5.71  2.10  .20  .63  32  .68 
9.64  2.49  6.15  2.11  .19  .61  .29  .68 
9.62  2.53  5.85  2.19  .20  .62  .32  .68 
9.44  2.58  6.09  2.16  .20  .60  .30  .67 
12.76  2.67  7.47  2.23  .15  .60  .25  .67 
18.74  2.68  13.29  2.23  .I0  .60  .I4  .67 
Source; Income Distribution Survey (HINK) data from Statistics Sweden, with the exceptions 
noted in n. a below. 
Note: The definition of  income in the Level of Living Surveys differs modestly from that in the 
HINK data. Statistics Sweden has a broader base for its income after 1991. The second set of 
figures for 1989 and 1990 is based on the new definition. 
aFrom the Level of Living Surveys. 
bNew definition 
poverty among children may have deleterious consequences for national pro- 
ductivity over the long run. 
There are four messages to be derived from the table. First, comparing the 
measures of inequality and relative poverty of factor incomes in table 1.3 with 
the comparable measures of labor market earnings in table 1.1 above, we see 
that factor incomes are far more unequally distributed than hourly wage rates 
or annual earnings. The 90/10 spreads in table 1.3 are on the order of eight or 
nine to one, roughly double the spreads in annual earnings in table 1.1, while 
the 10/50 measures of relative poverty are around 0.20, which is about half the 
10/50 differentials in  annual earnings. There are three reasons for this:  the 
inclusion of  people  out of  the labor market,  who have low factor incomes; 45  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
the inclusion of capital incomes, which are unequally distributed;* and the ex- 
clusion of unemployment benefits, early retirement, sick pay, and parental al- 
lowances from factor incomes even though these benefits are closely tied to 
previous work. In the appendix, we show that a measure of  income that in- 
cludes these benefits is more equally distributed than our measure of  factor 
income. 
Second, the table shows a huge difference between inequality in disposable 
incomes per person and in factor incomes. The 90/10 measure of inequality in 
disposable incomes is about a fourth as great as the comparable measure of 
inequality in factor incomes. Thus, inequality in disposable income is closer 
in magnitude to the inequality in hours earnings in table  1.1 than it is to in- 
equality in annual earnings. For instance, in  1990, the 90/10 spread in dispos- 
able incomes per person is 2.49, which contrasts to a 4.88 spread in annual 
earnings and a 2.05 spread in hourly earnings. That Sweden’s tax and transfer 
policies produce a very different distribution of disposable income than factor 
income is not a new finding. Lindbeck’s 1983 study of the Swedish income 
distribution showed a “much more uneven distribution of factor income than 
of disposable income,” which led him to conclude that “redistributive policies 
in Sweden must be regarded as quite successful on the basis of  egalitarian 
values” (Lindbeck 1992, 62). Our data confirm this conclusion. 
Third, the data show two patterns of change in inequality over time. From 
1967 to 1975-78,  inequality in disposable incomes falls, despite increases in 
factor income inequality. This reflects the egalitarian policies of  the period, 
which included high marginal taxes, a large increase in local taxes, and an 
extension of transfers and publicly provided services in the government bud- 
get. Consistent with this, Gustafsson and Uusitalo (1990) show a large increase 
in the redistributive effects of public transfers over the same period. The sec- 
ond pattern is an upward trend in factor income inequality from the late 1980s 
through 1991, followed by an even sharper jump in 1992, presumably due to 
the increase in  ~nemployment.~  This has, however, only a modest effect on 
disposable income inequality. Whereas from 1989 to 1992 the 90/10 differen- 
tial in factor incomes nearly doubled, the 90/10 differential in disposable in- 
comes increased by just 6 percent. Factor income inequality was three times 
as great in 1991 as in 1967, but disposable income inequality was less! Swed- 
ish tax and transfer policies prevented the trend toward increased factor income 
inequality from widening the distribution of disposable incomes, even in 1992, 
when unemployment rose substantially. 
8. In part, 1991 appears to be an exceptional year because many people changed the timing of 
their incomes to take advantage of the tax reforms; for further evidence, see Bjorklund, Palme, 
and Svensson (1995). 
9. But we show in the appendix that inequality of income from work and total income was more 
stable than inequality of factor incomes in total until 1990. Likely explanations for these diverging 
trends in the  1980s are rising early retirement and sickness pay.  In  1991, inequality of income 
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The fourth result is that tax and transfer policies acted to equalize disposable 
income between children and reduce the relative poverty among them. The 101 
50 ratio in column 8 is nearly constant at about two-thirds the median through- 
out the period covered in the table-despite  rising inequality and relative pov- 
erty per person in factor incomes among families with children, as among all 
families. The major transfer policies here are child allowances and parental 
leave. During the 1980s, child allowances were raised in real terms and a pro- 
gressive component introduced, which gives extra amounts for the third and 
next children. Both the increased amount and greater progressivity of the trans- 
fers for larger families have equalizing effects on the distribution of disposable 
incomes among children. The 1991 increase in child allowances that was part 
of the tax reform of that year explains why the relative poverty rate of children 
did not increase from 1990 to 1991 despite the increased relative poverty for 
people in terms of factor incomes in that period. 
For comparison, we estimated income per person in families with children 
in the United States in 1989, using the Swedish equivalence scales to adjust 
for family size. The resulting distribution of income per person showed a much 
wider distribution of  income among children than in Sweden. In the United 
States, the income of children in the bottom decile of the distribution of per 
person income associated with children was 33 percent of the median of that 
distribution.I0 Over time, child poverty rates rose from 14.2 percent in 1973 to 
19.9 percent in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, table 718), as earnings 
differentials widened  and Aid to Families with  Dependent  Children fell in 
real terms. 
These findings are consistent with previous research on the distribution of 
income among children in Sweden. Analyses based on data from the Luxem- 
bourg Income Study show that in the 1980s Sweden was particularly success- 
ful in generating equality and reducing poverty among children (Coder, Rain- 
water, and Smeeding 1989). Jantti and Danziger (1994) find that Sweden's tax 
and transfer system eliminated relative poverty (defined as 40 percent of  the 
median income in their study) among children, in contrast to the modest effects 
of American transfer policies. Poverty among children with single parents is 
rare in Sweden, both because of high labor force participation among single 
mothers and because of the transfer system. What is new in table 1.3 is the 
evidence that Sweden's redistributive system maintained the relative income of 
these families in the early 1990s, when factor income inequality began to in- 
crease. 
Should one view the divergence between factor income inequality and dis- 
10. In this calculation, we include reported transfers but do not adjust for taxes. Taking account 
of taxes will have little effect on the difference in income between the tenth decile and the median, 
but US.  household surveys typically understate the amount of transfer income relative to adminis- 
trative records and also understate the amount of capital income. We believe that the 33 percent 
figure that we calculated is probably lower than the actual figure. 47  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
posable income inequality in table 1.3 as a good thing or as a bad thing? On 
the plus side, the divergence  shows the efficacy of  Swedish transfer  and tax 
policies in buffering low-income citizens against a market trend toward a de- 
cline  in  their  relative  economic  position-which  is  what  a  social  welfare 
scheme focused on relative well-being is supposed to do. On the minus side, 
by breaking the link from market earnings to disposable income, such a redis- 
tributive system adversely affects work incentives, as Lindbeck has stressed in 
his critical assessment of the welfare state. And as the gap between factor in- 
come inequality and disposable income inequality grows, as it did in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the necessary transfers also have to rise, adversely af- 
fecting  government  budgets  and  increasing  deadweight  losses from  tax  or 
deficit financing. 
1.  I .4  The Transfer Programs 
What are the transfer programs that so greatly affected the distribution  of 
disposable income in Sweden? There are many such programs, each of which 
merits detailed analysis beyond the scope of  our study. We distinguish three 
types of programs according to their relation to work: 
Poverty Trap Programs. These are programs that are antithetical to work in that 
they go to people who are not working or who earn below a certain amount, 
require no previous work for eligibility, and are reduced or lost if the person 
gets  a job or  increases  market  earnings.  The archetype  is  a  means-tested 
benefit. 
Workfare Programs. These are programs  that increase the incentive to work 
because only people who work can use them but that can have negative effects 
on hours worked when the person attains eligibility. An example is the subsi- 
dized child-care program that is limited to families where parents work at least 
half-time. Other workfare transfer programs give money to workers who are 
not working but who had to work previously to be eligible-work  injury insur- 
ance, sickness cash benefits, and parental leave payment. 
Income Effect Programs. These are programs  that have an income effect on 
working by providing  money regardless  of  work activity. An example is the 
child allowance program, which goes to anyone who fits the criterion regard- 
less of work activity. 
Table 1.4 gives expenditures on the major transfer programs classified under 
these three headings. Medical care is practically free to all citizens and is one 
of the largest transfer programs,  with expenditures (exclusive of pensioners) 
of 2.6 percent of GNP. It is financed out of general taxes and not counted as 
part of personal income. While individuals pay for part of dental care through Table 1.4  The Major Transfer Programs in Sweden for Nonelderly Adults 
Expenditure as Share 





Sickness cash benefits 
Work injury insurance 
For all groups: 
Work-related transfers:' 




Sheltered work, wage subsidies and 
rehabilitation' 
For the disabled: 
For the unemployed: 
Unemployment benefits' 
Temporary jobs, training, wage subsidies, 
employment services' 





Temporary parents' cash benefits' 






































'Data  are  taken  from the  national  accounts  and  from  Statens  Offentliga Utredningar  (SOU) 
1993:38. The estimates are constructed from the assumption that the nonelderly consume 40 per- 
cent of medical care and that 10 percent is paid by fees. The nonelderly are assumed to consume 
80 percent of dental care. 
bFrom National Social Insurance Board (1992). 
<From  Boverket (National Board of Housing, Building, and Planning), reported in  1995. Social 
Insurance Statistics from the National Social Insurance Board. 
dFrom Statistics Sweden. 
'From Sarnhall and National Labor Market Board, figures for 1 July 1991-30 June 1992. 
'From National Labor Market Board, figures for 1 July 1991-30 June 1992. 
gEstimated as the number of children at day-care centers (300,000,  according to Statistics Sweden) 
times SKr 50,OOO  plus the number of children with subsidized day care in private homes (1  10,000, 
according to Statistics Sweden) times SKr 40,000. 
"From  Social Insurance statistics, with the part paid by noncustcdial parents excluded. 
Sickness cash benefits, work injury insurance, disability pension, training stipends, wages for 
sheltered jobs and temporary jobs, unemployment benefits, parental leave benefits, and temporary 
parents' cash benefits are subject to income tax. Thus, gross expenditures overstates the net burden 
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fees, some dental expenses are subsidized, accounting for an additional 0.4 
percent of  GNP. The public expenditure on medical care creates an income 
effect on the labor supply decision. 
Sickness cash benefits and work injury insurance are work-related transfers 
since eligibility requires a previous period of work. Both programs replace a 
constant fraction of previous earnings up to a limit, which is exceeded by less 
than 10 percent of all workers. The replacement rate for sickness benefits was 
90 percent until it was reduced in early  1991. The replacement rate for the 
work injury insurance has been similar to that for sickness. Together, the two 
programs cost 3.0 percent of GNP. 
The ultimate safety net is means-tested social assistance. This is a poverty 
trap program, although the social authorities require that the benefit-recipient 
actively seek work at the employment office and accept suitable jobs. In 1991, 
0.4 percent of GNP was spent on social assistance. Another means-tested trans- 
fer, of about equal magnitude, is the housing allowance, which is determined 
by the income of the family, the wealth, the rent, and the number of children.” 
We  next turn to the programs designed for certain groups. The disability 
pension amounts to 1.9  percent of GNP. Most disability pensions are given for 
medical reasons, even though workers above sixty years of age can be granted 
such for labor market reasons. We describe the program as a poverty trap be- 
cause disability pensions are purportedly sensitive to regional or cyclic labor 
market conditions. Still, many persons with disability pensions have such se- 
vere medical problems that the work disincentive of the disability pension will 
have no effect on behavior. Active labor market measures that provide jobs, 
training, and rehabilitation for the  disabled  are workfare programs,  by  our 
definition. The expenditure on these measures is 0.8 percent of GNP. Around 2 
percent of the workforce is employed with some form of subsidy for disability. 
The policies  for the unemployed  consist of  “passive” benefits  and active 
measures that provide jobs, training, and employment service. Unemployment 
benefits have a work disincentive effect, but this is counteracted by temporary 
jobs and training  slots offered to the unemployed  at employment offices. A 
benefit claimant who refuses to accept such jobs (or other jobs) can be denied 
further unemployment benefits (see Bjorklund and Holmlund 1991). 
Programs  for families with  children are extensive. They are designed to 
stimulate work by both parents. The day-care system, which covers the major- 
ity of  children, is a workfare program that encourages both parents to work 
since both must work (or study) to qualify for day-care slots. Parents pay a fee 
for the child, but 80-90  percent of the costs are subsidized. Most local authori- 
ties set lower fees for the second and third child of  the same family and for 
single parents. The child allowance (paid to the mother) is, as noted, an income 
effect program. The parental leave program offers benefits at the level of the 
11. We ignore the subsidies that cover the costs of  the interest payments on housing and the 
implicit subsidy in the deductibility of interest payments. 50  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
sickness benefit for a year for parents who have a work history and much lower 
support for parents who have not worked before the birth of the child and thus 
counts as workfare.’* There is also a temporary parents’ cash benefit paid to 
parents who stay home to care for sick children or for visits to the child’s day 
care or school. This is designed to facilitate parents combining work with par- 
enting. Finally, there is a maintenance allowance paid by  the government  if 
the noncustodial parent does not meet his obligations. This program costs the 
government around 0.2 percent of GNP. 
All told, table 1.4 shows that 16 percent of GNP is spent on the listed pro- 
grams. Nearly half the listed expenditures are workfare programs, a bit over a 
quarter are for programs that have an income effect on work, and a quarter are 
for programs that have a poverty trap component. What is impressive is that so 
much of the Swedish welfare system is work based. 
1.1.5  What an Egalitarian Income Distribution Means 
How does Sweden’s distributional record translate into the economic lives 
of people? To  answer this question, we contrast the living standards of some- 
one in the tenth percentile of the earningshcome distribution in Sweden with 
a comparable person in the United States. To compare Swedish and American 
incomes, we use the purchasing power parity statistics of the OECD for 1990 
rather than highly volatile exchange rates. In 1990, real gross domestic product 
per head was 26 percent higher in the United States than in Sweden (OECD 
1990, 27), with the result that on average Americans had a higher living stan- 
dard than  Swedes. To  estimate how well low-decile Swedish and American 
men  fared, we have calculated the  1991 hourly pay in Swedish kronor of a 
tenth-percentile Swedish man, and then adjusted this pay for the greater in- 
equality in pay in the United States and for the difference in overall living 
standards, to see how  much tenth-percentile American men  would make in 
krona purchasing power units. The results, shown in figure 1.4a, indicate that, 
because of  the narrower distributions of pretax earnings in Sweden, bottom- 
decile Swedish workers earned SKr 62.00 per hour in 1991-59  percent more 
than the SKr 39.00 per hour that a bottom-decile American worker was paid in 
that year!I3 Similarly, we have estimated the 1990 income (adjusted for OECD 
equivalence scales) of Swedish adults, twenty to sixty-four, and of  children, 
through seventeen years of age, and then adjusted these incomes for the greater 
inequality  in the  United  States and  the higher  living  standard. Figure  1.4b 
12. The lower basic amount is offered for three additional months for all parents. 
13. Our calculations understate the difference in the earnings or  income between low-decile 
Swedes and Americans because we used mean differences in  GDP per head to adjust for differ- 
ences in living standards but base our decile comparisons on calculations that compare distribu- 
tions based on medians. Since mean income differences exceed median differences, this implies 
that we have overstated how much low-income Americans make. Note also that, over time, the 
advantage of the low-paid Swede has risen. The earnings of low-decile Swedes rose sharply from 
1968 through  1981 and moderately thereafter; the real earnings of  low-decile Americans have 
declined since the early 1970s (OECD 1993, table 5.3). Fig. 1.4  Comparison of relative hourly earnings (a)  and disposable incomes (b) 
of individuals in the tenth percentile compared to GDP per head, United States 
and Sweden, 1990-91  (Sweden = 100) 
Sources: GDP per head is taken from OECD (1990, tables 1.3, 3.1). 
Hourly pay. Sweden, our calculation from LNU for male workers. United States, estimated from 
data in OECD (1993) as follows: Table 5.2 shows that the hourly pay of a tenth-percentile Ameri- 
can worker was 0.38 of the U.S. median in  1989 whereas the hourly pay of  a tenth-percentile 
Swedish worker was 0.76 of the median in the same year. We multiply the SKr 62.00 by  .38/.76 
to obtain the earnings that a tenth-percentile American would have if Sweden had the U.S.  earnings 
distribution. Then we  multiply this figure by  1.26 to account for the higher overall income per 
capita in America as shown in the GDP per capita figures. 
Disposable  income of  adults, twenty to sixty-four Sweden, our calculation from LNU based on 
the OECD equivalence scales. U.S., estimated from calculations based on the Luxembourg Income 
Survey done by Markus Jintti. These calculations show that in 1986 the tenth-percentile adult had 
disposable income, adjusted for the OECD equivalence scales, that was 0.34 of  the median in the 
United States compared to 0.64 in Sweden. We multiply the SKr 98,700 in Sweden by  .34/.64 to 
obtain the disposable income that a tenth-percentile American adult would have if Sweden had the 
U.S. income distribution, then multiply by  1.26 to account for the higher overall income in the 
United States. 
Disposable income of children, through age seventeen. Sweden, our calculations from LNU 
based on the OECD equivalence scales. United States, estimated from calculations based on the 
Luxembourg Income Survey done by  Markus Jantti. These calculations show that in  1986 the 
tenth-percentile child had disposable income, adjusted for the OECD equivalence scales, that was 
0.33 of the median in the United States compared to 0.59 in Sweden. We multiply the SKr 55,600 
in Sweden by .33/.59 to obtain the disposable income that a tenth-percentile American child would 
have if Sweden had the U.S. income distribution, then multiply by  1.26 to account for the higher 
overall income in the United States. 
Nore: Similar results are obtained if we use other estimated income distribution figures. According 
to Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995, table 4. I), a low-decile person in Sweden had dis- 
posable income that was 0.56 of the median in 1987, whereas a low-decile person in the United 
States had disposable income that was 0.35 of the median. 52  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
shows that low-decile adults in Sweden had disposable incomes exceeding those 
of low-decile adults in the United States by 50 percent and that low-decile chil- 
dren in Sweden had disposable incomes exceeding those of low-decile children 
in the United States by 42 percent. The greater component of public consump- 
tion in Sweden than in the United States and the likelihood that public consump- 
tion is more equally distributed than private consumption suggests that even 
these contrasts understate the difference in living standards of  adults and chil- 
dren in  the lower  part  of  the  Swedish  and American  income  distributions. 
The elimination of poverty among people low in the income distribution in 
Sweden compared to the poverty among people low in the income distribution 
in the wealthier United States is a major social achievement, per the Lindbeck 
quote with which we introduced this section. 
1.2  System or Swedes? 
Comparisons of Sweden and the United States are misleading. Sweden is a 
small country with a homogeneous  population. US.-Swedish differences 
reflect the greater heterogeneity  of Americans. Shouldn’t Sweden be com- 
pared to Minnesota rather than to the United States as a whole? 
-A  Critic 
To deal with this criticism, we have developed a more refined counterfactual 
to assess the effects of Sweden’s supposedly homogeneous population as op- 
posed  to its income  determination  system on distributional  outcomes.  Our 
ideal counterfactual experiment would be to move a random sample of Swedes 
to the United States (and Americans to Sweden) and to contrast the distribution 
of their incomes after some time with that of peers back home. Such an experi- 
ment would  eliminate population  homogeneity  as a cause of  differences in 
distributions and isolate the effect of skill formation, wage setting, taxes, and 
transfers. The closest we can come to this ideal with existing data is to contrast 
the income of people  of  Swedish descent in the United  States with that of 
people in  Sweden and the income in Sweden of Swedes with nowSwedish 
ancestry with that of Swedes with Swedish-born parents. 
To identify people of Swedish background in the United States for our test 
of  “system versus Swedes,” we used the ancestry question in the 1990 U.S. 
Census of Population. In 1990, the question was, “What is this person’s ances- 
try or ethnic origin?’  The coding allows people to report two ancestry groups 
(eg,  German-Irish). If people gave Swedish and a second group as their ances- 
try, we categorized them as being of partial Swedish descent; if they gave only 
Swedish as their ancestry, we categorized them as being of  full Swedish de- 
scent.14  The 1990 census contains the records of 53,468 men of Swedish ances- 
14. Another possible analysis would be  to compare the distribution of  earnings of  Swedish 
immigrants to the United States with that of those who remain in Sweden. Because of the potential 
selectivity of  immigrants, we chose to limit our analysis to people born in the United States with 53  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
try. In addition, we extracted a random sample of 98,18 1 Americans irrespec- 
tive of ancestry in  1990. On the Swedish side, we have data from the LNU 
survey of people with Swedish parentage who grew up in Sweden (which elim- 
inates immigrants and the children of immigrants). 
Table 1.5 presents the results of our analysis in terms of the 90/10- and 10/ 
50-decile hourly earnings ratios for male ~0rkers.l~  Row  1 gives these mea- 
sures for people of Swedish ancestry raised in Sweden. Rows 2 and 3 show 
inequality and relative poverty for people of full and mixed Swedish descent 
in the United States. Finally, row 4 gives figures for all people in the United 
States. The results are clear: people of  Swedish descent living in the United 
States have an earnings distribution similar to that of other Americans-a  dis- 
tribution utterly unlike that of Swedes in Sweden.16  By comparing people from 
the same ancestry, the table isolates the effect of systems of income determina- 
tion on distributions.” 
We cannot do the counterfactual of how the descendants of American immi- 
grants fare in Sweden: there are too few such people. We can, however, exam- 
ine how adults born of all immigrants fare in Sweden. Contrary to the image 
of homogeneous Sweden, in 1991 in the LNU survey, 15 percent of Swedish 
residents aged twenty to sixty-four reported that one or two of their parents 
were not Swedish citizens at birth: roughly three-quarters of these people re- 
ported that the language spoken at home was something other than Swedish; 
and half said it was a non-Nordic language. In the 1970s and 1980s, the frac- 
tion of the Swedish population with immigrant background roughly doubled: 
in 1974, 8.1 percent of Swedes aged twenty to sixty-four had at least one non- 
Swedish parent, whereas, in  1991, 15.1 percent reported having at least one 
non-Swedish  parent.  We  tabulated  the  hourly  earnings  distribution  for  all 
adults twenty to sixty-four who reported that at least one parent was not Swed- 
ish at birth (row 5 in table 1.5) and for the subset who reported that the lan- 
Swedish ancestry. There are too few Swedish immigrants to the United States in recent years to 
give a reasonable comparison in any case. 
15. We performed a similar analysis using the 1980 U.S. census, which coded for only a single 
ancestry group and obtained results like those in the table. Thus, our findings do not hinge on a 
particular census year. 
16. There are possible selectivity problems for people of Swedish descent in the United States 
owing to the selectivity of their ancestors, but we doubt that this substantively affects the results. 
If there is a selectivity problem, it is likely that Swedes in the United States come from a more 
homogeneous background than Swedes in Sweden. This is because economic analysis suggests 
that immigrants should be drawn from similar circumstances: the top or bottom of  an  income 
distribution rather than randomly. Their descendants might have  similar (although presumably 
much smaller) selectivity. 
17. A possible problem with our contrast is that measurement error in incomes may be much 
larger in the U.S. data than in  the Swedish data. The U.S. figures are self-reported, while the 
Swedish earnings data are from administrative records. But, while this might exaggerate the differ- 
ence in inequality between the United States and Sweden in general, there is no reason to expect 
it to affect the comparison of incomes of Americans of  Swedish descent with that of other Ameri- 
cans. And it is the absence of any discernible difference between the distributions of those two 
groups that is the key finding in the table. 54  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1.5  The Distribution of Earnings of Men, Sweden versus the United 
States, 1989-91 
Earnings of Workers 
Hourly  Annual 
90/10  10/50  901  10  10/50 
Swedes in Sweden  2.02  .77  2.74  .58 
Swedish descent in United States: 
Any Swedish ancestry  5.59  .38  10.4  .20 
Only Swedish ancestry  5.05  .41  7.0  .29 
United States, total  5.53  .39  10.0  .2 1 
Non-Swedes in Sweden  2.09  .71  4.27  .36 
Non-Nordics in Sweden  1.85  .74  4.42  .35 
Source: U.S. data are tabulated from public-use census files. We have used all the earnings/income 
data, including observations for which the census imputed incomes. The Census Bureau made a 
top-code adjustment in  1990 by giving everyone in a state with income above the top code the 
median income of  top-coded incomes in that state. We  experimented with several top codes, but 
they did not affect our distributions. Swedish data are tabulated from the LNU survey. The number 
of  observations in the Swedish data is limited. There were 1,513 observations for all Swedes in 
1989-91,233 for non-Swedes, and 104 for non-Nordic Swedes. By contrast, we have 53,468 men 
of Swedish ancestry and a random sample of 98,181 Americans irrespective of ancestry in 1990. 
guage spoken at home was neither Swedish nor another Nordic tongue (row 6 
in table 1.5).  For both groups, the 90/10 and 10/50 ratios of earnings are com- 
parable to those for people with parents born in Sweden.I8 The Swedish system 
of  wage determination produces  a dispersion of earnings among those with 
foreign parentage that is comparable to that of other Swedes, although annual 
earnings are somewhat more unequally  distributed among immigrants than 
among the native born. 
We conclude that the compressed income distribution in Sweden comes, not 
from some inherent homogeneity of Swedes, but rather from the Swedish sys- 
tem of determining skills and productivity and the wages and income rewards 
associated with such. This conclusion leads us naturally to the question of what 
that system actually does to compress incomes and eliminate poverty. 
1.3  The Supply Side of the Swedish System 
We use a supply-demand framework to examine how Sweden combined low 
wage inequality and a high employment rate for so many years. Our main con- 
18. Despite the fact that people of foreign ancestry earn less than others when a foreign language 
is spoken at home. We regressed in In hourly earnings of men on dummy variables for their ances- 
try in Sweden and obtained the following coefficients and standard errors: for any  parent not 
Swedish at birth, ,060 (.037); for parent not Swedish and other Nordic language spoken at home, 
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Fig. 1.5  Conditions during childhood by year of birth, 1892-1973 
Source: Our own computations from the Level of Living Surveys. 
trast is with the high-employmenthigh-inequality  United States, although we 
occasionally consider low-employmenflow-inequality  EEC countries as well. 
1.3.1  An Egalitarian Skill Distribution? 
There are two basic ways in which Swedish practices might produce an egal- 
itarian distribution of skills that supports a compressed wage structure: through 56  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
egalitarian family incomes, which should act to reduce inequality in human 
capital formation at home; and through an egalitarian distribution of day-care 
and public school resources. To see how these factors might affect outcomes, 
consider a production function that relates the market skills of young people 
to various background resources: 
(1)  skill of young = f (family resources; public resources; 
genetics; random factors). 
Equation  (1 ) represents the transmission  and augmentation of  skills across 
generations as a simple reduced form linking resources to outcomes. We use it 
to examine the likely effects of the distribution of resources in one generation 
on the distribution of skills in the next. We have already  seen that, in terms 
of disposable income among children, family resources are relatively equally 
distributed in Sweden. Children living with only one parent also fare reason- 
ably well in terms of income (Jantti and Danziger 1994),  in contrast to the high 
poverty rates for them in the United States. A skeptic might, however, argue 
that equalization of disposable income has contributed to the breaking down 
of the nuclear family, with deleterious consequences for children. We  find it 
difficult  to give much  credence  to this  claim, for the  basic  reason that  the 
Swedish record in family composition is “normal.” The percentages of families 
with children with only a single parent in the early 1980s were as follows: 
Sweden, 14.2  percent; Great Britain, 13 percent; Belgium and the Netherlands, 
12.3 percent;  Switzerland,  12 percent; Germany, 11.4 percent; France,  10.2 
percent; Ireland, 7.1 percent;  and the United  States, 26.0 percent  (Ermisch 
1990).  Data from the LIS reported by Danziger and Jantti (1993) tell a similar 
story: 14.8 percent of children in Sweden did not live with two parents in the 
1980s, compared to 12.5 percent in Canada, 10.5 percent in the Netherlands, 
and 23 percent in the United States. 
Moreover, for Sweden, at least the most important change in family condi- 
tions over time has been an improvement in the economic conditions of fami- 
lies with children rather than an increase in single-parent families. This evi- 
dence comes from three questions about conditions during childhood in the 
Level of  Living  Surveys for different cohorts: whether individuals  grew up 
with both biological parents (until age sixteen); whether their family had “eco- 
nomic difficulties” when they were growing up; and whether their family had 
“family conflicts.” The results, summarized in figure 1.5, show a decline in the 
proportion brought up with both biological parents, from 85  percent for those 
born in the late 1890s through the 1960s to around 80 percent afterward; an 
upward shift in the proportion reporting family conflicts; and, most striking, a 
drop in the proportion reporting economic difficulties, from around 40 percent 
for the earliest cohort to less than 10 percent for those born from 1950 to the 
1970s. There  is evidence,  moreover, that  these childhood  conditions  affect 
adult outcomes: Lundberg (1993) found that adverse outcomes on all three 
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health in adulthood, controlling for the social class of the father. 
Public resources that are most likely  to affect skill formation among the 
young are also relatively equally distributed in Sweden. The public day-care 
(or preschool) system (dugis)  for children from one to seven years old contri- 
butes to equal conditions during childhood. This system, run by the local gov- 
ernments, was built  up in the  1970s and  1980s. It offers highly  subsidized 
places for children  when both  parents  work (or study) at least part-time. In 
addition, the social authorities can place children with problems or from fami- 
lies with problems at the centers. Special resources are available for children 
with physical or social problems. Since the “graduates” of the day-care system 
have not yet entered the labor force in large numbers, we do not know how the 
system affects job performance. But two studies based on different (but rather 
small) data sets have found that children who participate have higher cognitive 
performance and are more likely to choose the academic track in high school 
than  nonparticipant  children  with  similar  parental  background  (Andersson 
1989; Jonsson 1994). 
School resources are also relatively equally distributed. Private schools are 
rare; and public resources are allocated so that, as Swedes say, “the size of the 
parents’  wallet shall not influence the school quality of the child.” National 
tests  are given to check that  all schools meet certain standards. Special re- 
sources are geared toward the least-able pupils. An egalitarian attitude toward 
allocation of school resources is shared across the political spectrum. It is also 
embodied  in  proposed  voucher  systems designed  to allow  parents  greater 
choice in schooling. Swedish voucher plans restrict the ways in which parents 
can “top up” vouchers with private spending. 
Has the relatively egalitarian distribution of family or public resources been 
important in Sweden’s attaining egalitarian labor market  outcomes? Our an- 
swer, derived from crude measures of the distribution of  skills and estimates 
of the effect of family background on labor market outcomes, is, surprisingly, 
that these are not major factors in Sweden’s distributional record. 
Consider first the distribution  of  the  simplest indicator of  human capital, 
years of schooling. In an In earnings equation, the variance of In earnings de- 
pends on the variance of  schooling, the variance of returns to schooling, and 
their covariance. If Swedish wage compression rested primarily on a compres- 
sion of skills, one might expect an especially small variance in years of school- 
ing. But, in fact, the dispersion of years attained in Sweden is greater than in 
the  United  States. Our calculations produce  a variance  of  years attained in 
Sweden of  12.25 for those aged twenty-five to sixty-four in the LNU survey. 
The variance of  years attained in the United States was 8.96 for men in the 
same age group.’9 
19. The greater dispersion in years of  schooling in Sweden than in the United States is also 
found in measures of relative variation: the coefficient of variation of years attained in Sweden is 
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Table 1.6  Test Scores in Science Achievement among Fourteen-Year-Olds in 
Advanced OECD Countries, 1980s 
Scores of Bottom 
Quartile Scores  25%  Ratios of Quartile Scores 
25%  Median  75%  Mean Score  25%  75%/25%  25%/Median 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Sweden 
United States 











15  19  22  12.2  11  1.47 
13  17  20  10.3  9  1.54 
15  18  22  12.3  10.9  1.47 
15  18  22  12.2  11  I .47 
15  19  22  12.4  11  1.47 
13  17  20  10.5  9  1.54 
16  19  22  13.7  13  1.38 
13  16  20  10.4  9  1.54 
17  21  24  13.7  12  1.41 
16  19  23  13.1  11  1.44 
15  18  21  12.5  11  1.40 
.79 
.76 









Source: Calculated from IEA (1988, tables 5 and 6). 
Notes; “%”  refers to the relevant percentile, so, e.g., “75%’  means “seventy-fifth percentile.” The 
twenty-fifth percentile of the bottom twenty-fifth percentile is approximately the bottom six per- 
cent of students. 
Years completed is, to be sure, a crude measure of the resources spent on 
schooling, much less of human capital formed in that process. In the United 
States, there is huge variation in the quality of  schooling among schools and 
in achievement scores across (as well as within) schools. In some school dis- 
tricts, some high school graduates may be nearly illiterate. The evidence shows 
that Sweden has a relatively egalitarian expenditure on nonuniversity school- 
ing. Variation in test scores across Swedish schools is much less than the vana- 
tion of test  scores across American  schools  or across  the  schools in  many 
other countries.*O 
But the equalization of  school spending and of  test scores among schools 
(as well as the equalization  of other public resources and of  disposable in- 
comes) has not produced  a particularly  narrow  distribution of  achievement 
scores among Swedish students, according to test scores from the International 
Association  for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement  (IEA). Table 1.6 
presents IEA statistics on the science achievement of  fourteen-year-old stu- 
20. Table 7 in IEA (1988) shows that, among developed countries, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and 
Norway have the lowest variation in  achievement scores across schools and the United States, 
Italy, and the Netherlands the highest. The coefficient of variation in the average score of  schools 
for the United States is .18, which is twice the Swedish coefficient of variation, .09. The ratio of 
the maximum school score to the minimum school score in the United States is 3.07, compared to 
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dents. Columns 1-5  give the quartile scores in Sweden, the United States, and 
other countries included in the 1988 study. These columns also give the mean 
score of  the bottom quartile and the bottom quartile of the bottom quartile 
(roughly the lowest 6 percent of  students).  Columns 6 and 7 give ratios  of 
test scores for the seventy-fifth percentile student to the twenty-fifth percentile 
student and of the scores for the twenty-fifth percentile to the median. To facili- 
tate comparisons, we give the average of  the scores for all advanced OECD 
countries save Sweden and the United States as well as the scores for each 
country. The table shows that fourteen-year-old students have a more narrow 
distribution  of  science scores in  Sweden than  in the United  States but that 
the distribution of scores among Swedish students is normal. In each statistic, 
Sweden has just about the average for all the countries, whereas the United 
States evinces greater dispersion. 
While scores on school achievement tests are far from ideal measures of 
the dispersion in “economic ability” that presumably contributes to earnings 
inequality, the distributions in the table lend no support to the notion that, by 
equalizing opportunities among children, Sweden greatly eased the  path  of 
equalizing outcomes in the labor market. 
1.3.2  The Role of Family Background 
Consider next the possible effect of Sweden’s compression of family income 
differences on the economic outcomes of  children, as captured in a simple 
relation linking sons’ earnings (Y) to fathers’ earnings (X): 
(2)  1nY = a + blnX+ u. 
Taking variances yields a relation between variation in backgrounds and the b 
coefficient to earnings inequality: 
(3  1  var(1n r) = b2  var ln(X) + var u. 
The variance of the In earnings of fathers in Sweden in the LNU ranges from 
0.24 to 0.32 over the period  1967-73,  for an average of  0.29 (Bjorklund and 
Jantti  1993, table 1). This compares to variances in the U.S. Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) in 1967-71  that range from 0.34 to 0.76, for an aver- 
age of 0.50 (a much smaller variance than the census-based estimate in table 
1.5 for all U.S. men). Given an estimate of b, we can readily calculate how 
much earnings inequality would rise in Sweden or fall in the United States if 
Swedes and Americans had the same dispersion of  fathers’ earnings. To esti- 
mate b, we rely on correlations between fathers’ and sons’ earnings in the two 
countries from Bjorklund  and Jantti. They obtain father-son correlations for 
the  United  States (based on different years and estimating techniques) that 
cluster around 0.40, compared to correlations for Sweden of about 0.25 (Bjor- 
klund and Jantti  1993, 18). This finding can be interpreted as higher social 
mobility in Sweden than in the United States. 
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Table 1.7  Estimates of the Effect of the Variance in Fathers’ Earnings on 
Sons’ Earnings under Swedish and U.S. Intergenerational 
Mobility Patterns 
United States 
(PSID)  Sweden (LNU)  Difference 
Basic data 
1. Posited variance of sons to be explained 
2. Variance of In earnings of fathers 
3. Correlation, fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
4. Correlation coefficient squared 
5. Contribution of background to variance 
6.  Residual variance 
Predicted variance of In earnings of son given 
7. Other country’s variance of fathers’ In 
earnings but own-country correlation of 
fathers’ and sons’ earnings 
8. Other country’s correlation of fathers’ and 
sons’ earnings but own-country variance of 
fathers’ In earnings 
9. Other country’s contribution of background, 
other country’s correlation of fathers’ and 
sons’ earnings, and other country’s variance 














.02  .06 




Source: Calculated from statistics in Bjorklund and Jantti (1993). 
in variance of fathers’ incomes between the United States and Sweden could 
account for the difference in the variance of sons’ incomes. For simplicity (and 
to obtain as large an estimate of the contribution of background as possible), 
we assume a stable earnings distribution, with the result that the variance of 
sons’ earnings is the same as that of fathers’. (In fact, the variance of sons’ 
earnings is greater in both Sweden and the United States than of fathers’ earn- 
ings, potentially reflecting life-cycle factors and trends toward increased earn- 
ings inequality.) Row 1 of the table gives the estimated variance of In earnings: 
0.50 in the United States and 0.29 in Sweden. Row 2 gives the variance of 
earnings of fathers. Row 3 gives the estimated correlation coefficients in the 
two countries. Row 4 gives the correlation coefficients squared. These figures 
in turn give us the estimated contribution of the variation in fathers’ earnings 
to sons’ earnings in row 5 and, by subtraction, the residual variance in row 6. 
The difference in residual variances of 0.15 is 7 1 percent of the difference in 
initial variances, implying that at most 29 percent of the gap in variances could 
be due to this background factor. 
Rows 7-9  record the variance in earnings that would be found in Sweden or 
the United States under the counterfactuals that each country had the other’s 
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and that each had the other’s intergenerational correlation but its own variance 
in fathers’ earnings. These calculations show that giving each group the other’s 
variance in fathers’ earnings has a relatively modest effect on the final vari- 
ance. If Americans had the Swedish dispersion of fathers’ earnings, dispersion 
of earnings would fall to 0.47, .03 points of the 0.21-point gap. If Swedes had 
the American dispersion of fathers’ earnings, the dispersion of earnings would 
rise to 0.30, a .01 change. Changing to the other country’s intergenerational 
correlation in row 8 has a bigger effect on the final variances of earnings, rais- 
ing the Swedish variance of the In earnings of the son by .04 In points (from 
.30 to .34). Finally, taking the full effect of the other country’s contribution of 
background in row 9 still leaves unexplained the bulk of the gap in the variance 
in sons’ earnings between the countries. With the contribution of background 
to inequality in the United States, the variance of In earnings of sons in Sweden 
would rise from .29 to .35, far short of the SO  variance of In  earnings in the 
United States. At most, we can attribute 30 percent of the difference in the 
variance of sons’ earnings to differences in the contribution of backgrounds.21 
The lower father-son earnings correlation in  Sweden than  in the United 
States in the table is open to alternative interpretations. A human capital inter- 
pretation might be that Sweden’s higher provision of  social goods and use of 
day-care facilities for children reduce the contribution of family in the produc- 
tion  of  children’s human  capital.  Another  interpretation  would  be that  the 
smaller effect of fathers’ income on earnings is part of Sweden’s compression 
of wages, which reduces the effects of skill on earnings, including skills ob- 
tained from parents. Yet another interpretation would be that Sweden has been 
more successful in equalizing opportunities. 
However one interprets the difference in intergenerational income mobility, 
table  1.7 shows that equalization of  parental earnings produces only limited 
equalization of outcomes. Equalization of background or opportunities is not 
sufficient to give the narrow distribution of earnings observed in Sweden. Pro- 
ducing an egalitarian earnings distribution requires direct intervention  in the 
income determination process. 
1.4  Demand-Side Contributions 
Who demands less-able workers  in Sweden at relatively  high pay? What 
programs or policies augment the demand for these workers? 
1.4.1  The Public Sector 
One widely  mentioned possibility  is that the public sector operates as an 
employer of last resort, hiring people who could not obtain comparable-paying 
21. We explain .06  points of the .21-point difference. The .06 is the difference between rows 1 
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jobs in the private sector. To explore this hypothesis, we tabulated the propor- 
tion of workers employed in the public sector from the Level of Living Surveys 
of  1968, 1974, 1981, and 1991, categorizing level of skill in three ways. First, 
we use low  education,  specifically, whether individuals aged forty-five and 
older at most completed thefokkolu (which means that they have six or seven 
years of  schooling), as an indicator of low  In 1968, roughly one-third 
of the population of older workers were in this category, but, in  1991, just 
about 15 percent or so had so little schooling. Thus, the extent to which the 
group is low-skilled increases over time. Second, we use the quartile distribu- 
tion of workers by their wages. We use quartiles rather than deciles for reasons 
of sample size. Third, we use the health status of  individuals based on their 
self-reported  mobility from three questions: “Can you walk  100 meters rela- 
tively  quickly  without  trouble?’  “Can  you  run  100 meters  without  much 
trouble?’  and “Can you walk up and down stairs without trouble?’ We classify 
respondents who answer yes to all questions as having normal mobility; those 
who answer no to one or two questions as having reduced mobility; and those 
who answer no to all three as having severely limited mobility. Approximately 
10-15  percent of the population report some mobility restriction, with the frac- 
tion declining over time. 
Table 1.8 shows the proportion  of  workers in these groups working in the 
public sector. The percentage of less-educated older workers employed in the 
public sector tends to be below  the percentage of all workers  in the public 
sector, especially for men. Men with earnings in the low quartile are also no 
more likely to be in the public sector than men elsewhere in the earnings distri- 
bution in 1991 and less likely to be in the public sector in other years. Women 
with low-quartile earnings are less likely than other women workers to be in 
the public sector in all years. As for those with low physical mobility, in 198  1 
and 1991,  individuals with reduced mobility are no more likely to work for the 
public sector than other workers. Women with severely limited mobility were, 
however, more likely to be public sector workers in those two years, as are men 
with severely limited skills in 1991. However, interpreting these figures, note 
that the employers of the 2 percent or so of the labor force that is handicapped 
or disabled receive special  subsidies; about half  are employed  in  sheltered 
workshops in a government-run corporation (Samhall) and half at other work 
sites whose wages the state subsidizes in part. Samhall is part of  the public 
sector, and the  figures for those with  severely  limited mobility  may reflect 
this fact. 
That low-skill workers are no more likely to be employed in the public sec- 
tor in 1991 than other workers does not, however, mean that public sector em- 
ployment has not buttressed demand for them. The pattern in most countries is 
22. For most cohorts born after 1950, at least nine years of  schooling was compulsory. There- 
fore, the group that we identify is an absolutely and relatively low-skilled group over the entire 
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Table 1.8  Percentage of Twenty- to Sixty-four-Year-Old  Workers Employed in 
the Public Sector, by Quartile in the Hourly Earnings Distribution, 
Low-Skill, and Physical Mobility Status, 1968-91 





































































































Source: Tabulated from the Level of  Living Surveys. Note that the quartile distributions exclude 
the self-employed. 
for low-skill workers to be underrepresented in the public sector, and finding 
equal representation  is therefore  surprising. As the last column in table 1.8 
shows, moreover, the proportion of low-skill workers in the public sector in- 
creased from 1968  to 1991. We interpret the upward trend and their proportion- 
ate representation in Sweden as signs that the public sector has, indeed, been 
a greater demander of their labor than in other countries. 
1.4.2  The Disabled or Handicapped 
Handicapped or disabled workers are likely to have lower productivity than 
other workers, and in many countries these workers are among the poorest. In 
Sweden, they have relatively normal incomes. Determining how Sweden does 
this provides an important insight into the Swedish workfare system and clues 
into  the  way  the  Swedish  system  treats  other,  less  clearly  defined,  low- 
productivity groups. 
Sweden seeks to get the disabled jobs at wages above their marginal product. 
As noted, Samhall employs a substantial proportion of these workers; it pays 64  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
the normal rate for a job and receives half of its budget from the state rather 
than from the sales of goods. In normal years, about half the budget of  the 
Swedish Labor Market Board is spent on the employment of disabledhandi- 
capped workers. Table 1.9 records the work time of  people in Sweden with 
differing levels of disability, as measured by responses to the questions on mo- 
bility in 1981 and 1991. A high proportion of people with reduced or severely 
limited mobility work, with relatively high contracted hours: only 5 percent or 
so below the hours worked by persons with normal mobility. This implies that 
short working hours have not enabled the disabled to get jobs in Sweden. How- 
ever, in table 1.9, the panel C data on sickness days show that those with re- 
duced or severely limited mobility take many more sickness days than others- 
three  to five times  as much  among  men  and two  to  three  times  as much 
among women. 
Figures on sick days display  the two  sides of  a welfare state that makes 
benefits  contingent on working.  On the one side, the sickness pay program 
maintains the incomes of those who suffer disabilities. On the other side, the 
program  gives workers disincentive to work once they have a job. Take the 
disincentive effect first, as economists often do. If we assume that the typical 
full-time Swedish worker takes five weeks of vacation and two weeks of holi- 
day, he or she would work forty-five weeks a year. The figures for people with 
normal mobility  show that, in 1981, they took an additional three weeks of 
sickness time, giving forty-two weeks of actual time worked in a year (which 
Table 1.9  Employment Rates, Working Hours, and Sickness Days of Swedish 
Adults, Twenty to Sixty-four 
Males  Females 
1981  1991  1981  1991 
A. Percentage at Work at Time of Interview 
Normal mobility  .93  .90  .83  37 
Reduced mobility  .77  .68  .61  .65 
Severely limited mobility  .65  .63  .46  .54 
B. Annual Contractual Hours Conditional on Work 
~  ~~ 
Normal mobility  2,040  2,030  1,490  1,680 
Reduced mobility  2,030  2,000  1,480  1,660 
Severely limted mobility  1,950  2,110  1,460  1,550 
C. Annual Sickness Days Conditional on Work 
Normal mobility  13  15  16  22 
Reduced mobility  52  81  40  77 
Severely limited mobility  75  102  66  105 
Source: Level of Living Surveys. Note that the data in panels B and C refer to the previous calen- 
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is consistent with the 1,654 or so hours reported for full-time Swedish workers 
in OECD [  1990, table  1.41). This is an extraordinarily high rate, as in most 
countries people have much less sick time; American workers average about a 
week in workdays lost because of sickness (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 
table 188). OECD statistics show that 6.1 percent of Swedish work time is lost 
owing to illness, versus 1.2 percent of U.S.  work time (OECD 1991, table 6.3). 
As there is no reason to believe that Swedes are more sickly than non-Swedes 
(expected life spans would suggest the opposite, and occupational illness is, if 
anything, lower in Sweden than in other countries [OECD 1989a, chap, 4]), 
we interpret this as reflecting economic responsiveness  to incentives. Under 
the prereform Swedish sick-leave system, sick time was paid exclusively by 
the government, so neither workers nor firms had an incentive to minimize sick 
time. Indeed, the opposite was probably true in many situations. Just as sea- 
sonal employers in the United States and their prospective workers know that 
part of the job involves several months of unemployment insurance during the 
off season, Swedish employers may have found that implicitly approving that 
workers exploit the sick-time system made their workplace more attractive to 
employees. 
To see the redistributive part of Swedish sickness pay policy, assume that the 
difference in sickness days between workers with reduced or severely limited 
mobility and those with normal mobility is in fact due to physical problems. 
Men with limited mobility take roughly nine weeks of  sickness leave beyond 
what men with normal mobility take, working just thirty-three weeks over the 
year or 21 percent less than men with normal mobility. Does this produce a 21 
percent or so difference in annual earnings or a large difference in hourly earn- 
ings? To answer this question, we regressed the In hourly earnings and In  an- 
nual  earnings of Swedish workers on age, age squared, years of  schooling, 
and dummy variables for mobility status in 1981. We estimate that the hourly 
earnings of men with reduced mobility  were just -.06  In  points lower than 
those of men with normal mobility, with a standard error of  .04; similarly, we 
estimate that the hourly earnings of men with severely limited mobility were 
just -.02,  with a standard error of .04. For annual earnings, we found no differ- 
ence by mobility status: the regression coefficients (standard errors) were .02 
(.09) for severely limited mobility  and  .OO (.07) for those with reduced mo- 
bility. 
Save for the fact that women work fewer hours on average because they are 
more likely to work part-time than men, results for women are the same. In 
1991, the typical female worker contracted for forty-two weeks of  full-time 
work (=  1,680/40); in 1981, she worked 37.3 weeks (= 1,490/40). Assuming 
that she took five weeks of  vacation time and two weeks of holiday time, she 
worked 30.3 weeks in 1981. Table 1.9 shows that she also took 3.5 weeks of 
sickness days; therefore, she worked about twenty-seven weeks full-time over 
the year. The woman with reduced mobility worked about five weeks less than 
this (twenty-two weeks), whereas the woman with severely limited mobility 
worked nearly ten weeks less (seventeen weeks of full-time labor). Thus, those 66  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
with less than normal mobility worked  19-37  percent less than women with 
normal  mobility.  But  neither the  hourly  wages  nor  the  annual  earnings of 
women with mobility limitations were lower than those of women without mo- 
bility limitations. 
Our results are not peculiar to the LNU survey or our definitions of  work 
disability: Wadensjo (1984, table 14.6) reports similar results in the 1978 Liv- 
ing Conditions Survey. At a cost of excessive use of sickness days by nondis- 
abled workers, Sweden’s sickness pay system has kept disabledhandicapped 
workers close to the median of the annual earnings distribution. 
By contrast, consider how workers who are handicapped or disabled fare in 
the United States. For  this purpose, we use the 1990 U.S. Census of Popula- 
tion, which asks workers the following: 
Because of a health condition that has lasted for 6 or more months, does 
this person have any difficulty- 
a. going outside the home alone, for example, to shop or visit a doctor’s 
office? 
b. taking care of his or her own personal needs, such as bathing, dressing, 
or getting around inside the home? 
In addition, the U.S. census asked: 
Did this  person have a physical,  mental, or other health  condition that 
a. limits the kind or amount of work this person can do at a job? 
b. prevents this person from working at a job? 
lasted for 6 or more months and which- 
To parallel the Swedish mobility questions, we defined disabled workers in 
three ways. Our first group of disabled workers consists of those who answered 
yes to any healtkdphysical condition question. Twelve percent of U.S. men aged 
twenty to sixty-four answered yes at least once. This compares to 11 percent 
of the Swedish men whom we categorized as having some mobility limitation. 
Our second group consists of those who answered yes to at least two of these 
healtWphysica1 questions; this is comparable to our definition in the Swedish 
data of individuals who are severely limited, and in fact 3 percent of U.S. men 
were in this category, just as 3 percent of Swedish men were in the comparable 
category. Our third group consists of men who answered yes only once to the 
three questions; this is comparable to our definition  in the  Swedish data of 
persons having reduced mobility. 
The U.S.  data show that, in the United States, work disability has a massive 
adverse effect on  whether the worker  was  employed  in  the  survey week.23 
Workers with no disability had an 85 percent employment rate (which com- 
pares to the 90 percent rate in Sweden), but those with at least some disability 
had a 45 percent employment rate (which compares to 68 percent in Sweden). 
23. Our subsample from the census had  138,531 observations, and therefore all the differences 
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Only 22 percent of the men who answered yes two or more times to the disabil- 
ity questions worked (which compares to 63 percent in Sweden). To  see how 
the disabled fared in terms of  earnings, we regressed  the In hourly earnings 
and In  annual earnings of American men on age, age squared, years of school- 
ing,24  and dummy variables for disability status and obtained huge negative 
coefficients and small standard errors. We estimate that the hourly earnings of 
men with some disability was -.16  (standard error .0l) In points lower than 
for men with normal mobility and that the annual earnings of men with some 
disability  was  -.49  (standard  error .01) In  points lower than for men  with 
normal mobility. 
1.4.3 
If low-skill workers are paid more in Sweden than they would be paid in a 
more market-driven system of wage setting, someone must foot the bill for the 
higher wages of those workers. In the case of the disabled, it is clear that the 
rest of society pays by subsidizing their employers or their sickness days. Might 
something similar be true of other low-skill workers? Does Sweden “pay” for 
its egalitarian wage policies and full employment through higher prices for the 
goods produced by the less skilled? 
In traded goods, where the price of the commodity is given on world mar- 
kets, it is presumably not possible to shift the cost of higher wages for the less 
skilled to consumers. In nontraded goods and services, however, a large share 
of the increased wages for the less skilled may very well be borne by consum- 
ers. If this were the case, we would expect the prices of commodities or ser- 
vices produced by low-wage workers to be relatively higher in Sweden than in 
the United States, which does not have a compressed wage structure. By con- 
trast, if the compressed wage structure was due solely to a compressed skill 
distribution, we would not expect to find such a pattern since the cost of  an 
efficiency unit of labor would be no higher in Sweden than in the United States. 
We have not explored the relation between relative prices and the share of 
low-skill labor across sectors and can report only glimmers of evidence on this 
possible relation. Comparative dollar price levels of  final expenditures from 
the OECD show that Sweden has high relative prices in one nontraded goods 
sector that hires relatively many low-skill workers-restaurants,  cafks, and ho- 
tels. The comparative dollar price in Sweden is 1.27 times the price of GDP in 
purchasing  power panty terms, while in the United States it is 0.84 (OECD 
1990, table 2.6)-a  51 percent  difference in  relative prices.  In that  sector, 
moreover, labor costs are 73 percent of value added compared to 50  percent in 
the United States. By contrast, in the finance sector, where workers are rela- 
tively skilled, labor’s share is 36 percent of value added in the United States, 
Earnings Equalization, Relative Prices, Shadow Wages 
24. The 1990 U.S. Census of Population does not contain a simple years of schooling measure, 
so we coded the reported highest level of  education into a years variable for comparison with the 
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compared to 31 percent in Sweden (OECD 1989b). To  the extent that high 
collectively bargained wages for low-skill workers are passed on to Swedish 
consumers in the form of high prices, the consumers are “indirectly” subsidiz- 
ing those workers. 
Finally, and more speculatively, consider the possible effect of the compres- 
sion of hours worked in Sweden on the demand for less-able workers. Could 
it be that Sweden has generated demand for less-productive workers by effec- 
tively reducing hours worked by more productive substitute workers, creating 
an implicit system of work sharing? On the supply side, assume that high mar- 
ginal taxes, the five-week mandated vacation,  holiday time, the incentive  to 
call in  sick, and parental  leave all reduce  the hours  worked  by  more  able 
Swedes. This implies that, on the demand side of the market, a firm that would 
like to hire twenty-six hundred hours from Mr. Able finds that he is willing to 
work only sixteen hundred hours unless he is paid a substantial premium. If 
that premium exceeds his value to the firm, the firm will try to get the extra 
thousand hours from someone else. In effect, the firm faces a shadow cost for 
an extra hour of a more productive  worker far above the hourly wage. What 
will the firm do? Hire Mr. Less Able to take up the slack. By this argument, 
Swedish policies that compress wages and provide incentives to work less than 
the  contracted  hours  have  produced  massive  “work  sharing.”  Raising  the 
shadow price for skilled workers relative to less-skilled workers can, in prin- 
ciple, “undo” the effect of wage compression in reducing demand for the less 
skilled. 
Is there any evidence that creating incentives that limit the hours worked by 
the more able increases the demand for labor of other workers? What plausibly 
might happen to the demand for less-able Swedes if, say, the more able worked 
30 percent more hours than  they currently do (which would give the upper 
decile of Swedes the same hours worked as in the United States)? 
We have not estimated the demand for labor necessary to answer these ques- 
tions but draw the reader’s attention to studies of the trade-off between hours 
worked and employment, which suggest that, for workers doing similar work, 
our hypothesis is on the right track. Houpis’s (1993) summary of studies of 
the hours/employment trade-off  for the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Belgium, and Sweden (Pencavel and Holmlund 1988) shows a uniform trade- 
off with elasticities that range around 0.7. That is, a 10 percent reduction in 
hours worked is associated with increases in the number employed of about 7 
percent.25  Applied to the entire economy, these estimates suggest that there is 
a substantial hours/employment trade-off  consistent with an “implicit-work- 
sharing” explanation of part of the puzzle identified in figure 1.3 above: how 
25. The analyses of Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) and others of how demand for labor re- 
sponds to the premium for overtime (which would reduce hours worked) tell a similar story. They 
show that, if the United States raised its overtime premium from 1.5 to 2 times the base wage, 
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Sweden  managed  to  combine  full  employment  and  a  narrow  wage  distri- 
bution.26 
1.5  Conclusion: Consequences of Reforms and Crisis 
This paper has documented the great success of the Swedish welfare state 
in eliminating poverty and reducing inequality and in combining low disper- 
sion in wages and high employment. Our evidence suggests that much of the 
success in reducing poverty was due to Sweden’s tax and transfer systems and 
that the combination of high employment and low wage inequality was associ- 
ated with factors that directly or indirectly twisted labor demand in favor of 
less-skilled workers. We have also advanced an interpretation of the Swedish 
experience that highlights the compression of hours worked on the demand for 
less-skilled workers. 
The redistribution  and elimination of poverty did not come without cost to 
Sweden. The huge welfare state that developed  in the  1970s and  1980s had 
both a direct cost in terms of high taxes and indirect costs in the form of excess 
burdens and disincentives (see Aronsson and Walker, chap. 5 in this volume). 
As Sweden entered the  1990s, there was widespread  opinion  among econo- 
mists that the nation should withdraw from some of its welfare state commit- 
ments:  the costs of some programs  at least seemed to exceed their benefits. 
The economic crisis and huge budget deficits of the early 1990s also seemed 
to demand cutbacks in welfare state programs. 
How far has Sweden already gone in this “withdrawal from dangerous terri- 
tory”? What are the consequences  for the elimination of  poverty? How far 
can Sweden go in reducing the excesses of the welfare state without seriously 
threatening the great success of that state in eliminating poverty? 
The policy reforms put into place through  1992 do not appear seriously to 
threaten the country’s reduction of poverty. The 1991 tax reform reduced the 
progressivity of the system but mitigated the effects on lower-income families 
through higher child allowances and housing allowances. Our table 1.3 showed 
a sizable rise in inequality (the 90/10 spread) of disposable income from 1990 
to 1991 but no increase in relative poverty (the 10/50 spread). The rise in in- 
equality did not continue in 1992 even though factor income inequality became 
much more unequal owing in large part to increased unemployment. 
There have been  a substantial  number of  budget cuts since 1991 that are 
difficult to describe with a single statistic, and we accordingly discuss only a 
few, to give the  flavor of  the  ongoing reforms  and  some of  the  suggested 
changes. To  help our discussion, we use table 1.10, which gives the distribu- 
tional  profile of  three important transfers:  sickness benefits,  unemployment 
26. We  also recognize that at some point reductions in hours by  at  least some of  the more 
able should decrease the demand for the less skilled. Certainly, reductions in the work activity of 
entrepreneurs or inventors or others whose skills complement those of the less skilled are likely 
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Table 1.10  Disposable Income, Sick Pay, Unemployment Benefits, and Child 
Allowance (general and progressive part) by Quartile Group in 1990 
Distribution of Adjusted Disposable Income (SKr 1,000) 
Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth 
All 20-64  Years, by Quartile Group 
Mean adjusted DI  48.5  74.1  95.2  139.3 
Sick pay  3.6  5.8  7.5  7.9 
(7)  (8)  (8)  (6) 
Unemployment benefits  1.1  1.5  1 .O  .9 
(2)  (2)  (1)  (1) 
Child allowance (general)  2.6  2.2  1  .o  .4 
(5)  (3)  (1)  (0) 
Child allowance (progressive)  .4  .1  .o  .o 
(1)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Children 0-17  Years 
Mean adjusted DI  45.7 
(25) 
(5) 
Child allowance (general)  18.3 
Child allowance (progressive)  5.8 
Sick pay  11.5 












Source: Our own tabulations from the Level of Living Surveys. 
Note: DI = disposable income. Numbers in parentheses are percentages of DI. 
benefits (unemployment insurance plus cash assistance) and child allowances. 
The table shows the importance of these transfers in the four quartile groups 
of the distributions of adjusted disposable income for the adults aged twenty 
to sixty-four and children through age seventeen on whom we have focused. 
When the share of income attributable to a given transfer is greater for those 
with low incomes than for those with high incomes, the transfer reduces rela- 
tive inequality and lowers relative poverty. Conversely, when the share of in- 
come from a transfer is smaller for those with lower incomes than for those 
with higher incomes, the transfer is regressive. 
The table shows that, for adults aged twenty to sixty-four, the share of dis- 
posable income attributable to sick pay is rather evenly distributed among in- 
come classes: the fraction of disposable income for adults is roughly the same 
in the highest-quartile group as in the lowest-quartile group.27  This presumably 
27. The figures in the table exaggerate the amount of  sickness benefits relative to disposable 
income because the benefits are measured gross of taxes when in fact they are taxable. 71  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
reflects the widespread use of sickness benefits in Sweden noted earlier. Unem- 
ployment benefits constitute a larger proportion of the disposable income of 
low-income than high-income individuals, but, given the low rate of  unem- 
ployment in  1990, such benefits are just a minor share of the income of any 
adult group. The unemployment benefit share of disposable income is likely to 
be higher for all groups in 1992-94, when unemployment rose sharply, and we 
would guess that the share would rise more for low-income than high-income 
individuals, but our data are silent on this point. The most progressive benefits 
are child allowance benefits, which constitute a much larger proportion of the 
income of low-quartile than of high-quartile individuals. 
The bottom part of the table shows that, for children through age seventeen, 
all the benefits, including sick pay (for the parents of children), are a consider- 
ably higher proportion of disposable income for those from low-income fami- 
lies than for those from higher-income families. Sickness benefits paid to the 
parents of  children in the lowest quartile account for 25 percent  of  dispos- 
able income, compared to  11 percent of  disposable income paid to parents 
whose children are in the highest quartile. Thus, with the exception of sickness 
benefits for  all adults, the transfers  in the table  are progressive, generally 
highly so.28 
How are these benefit systems changing? What are the likely consequences 
of change for the distribution of incomes? 
The sickness benefit system has undergone several changes. In March 1991, 
the replacement rate for sickness was reduced from 90 to 65 percent for the 
first three days, left at 90 percent until the ninetieth day, then reduced to 80 
percent thereafter. In 1992, employers were required to pay for the first two 
weeks of sickness benefits, giving them an incentive to monitor the program. 
In 1993, a waiting period of one day was introduced so that the worker would 
also lose something by calling in  sick. At this writing, there is discussion of 
further reductions in the replacement  rate to 70 percent or to as low as 50 
percent. These changes will reduce the earnings of disabled or sick workers 
but, according to the calculations in table  1.10, are not likely to change in- 
equality or relative poverty. However, they will redistribute  income against 
children in the lower quartile of the distribution unless reductions in benefits 
disproportionately increase the work time of low-income parents. 
In 1993, benefits to unemployed workers were also reduced. The replace- 
ment rate dropped from 90 to 80 percent, and a waiting period of one week 
28. These results can be sensitive to the equivalence scales and to the way  the scales treat the 
costs of having additional children. The Swedish scales do not allow for economies of scale for 
additional children: the cost of  an extra child is the same as the cost of the first child. This raises 
the possibility that the progressivity of the child allowance is due largely to the equivalence scale. 
To see if this is the case, we computed a version of table 1.10 with an equivalence scale that allows 
for economies of scale in children by  using a square root of the number of people in the  family 
(see Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995).  The child allowance benefits become less progres- 
sive with this scale but remain strongly progressive. 72  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
was introduced. Similarly, the benefits paid in various training and temporary 
job programs were also lowered modestly. Some policy makers and analysts 
favor further reductions in replacement rates to 70 or 60 percent. Read conser- 
vatively, the figures in table 1.10 suggest that this will increase inequality but 
may have little effect on relative poverty since the second quartile receives a 
similar fraction of  disposable income in unemployment benefits as the first. 
However, we are loathe to make any strong statement on this owing to the 
massive change in unemployment, which could easily affect the distribution 
of benefits. 
By contrast with sickness pay and unemployment benefits, there have been 
no reductions in child allowances, although some analysts have proposed such. 
In 1991, in fact, child allowances were raised to counteract the consequences 
of  the tax  reform  on children with parents in the lower part of the income 
distribution. As child allowances are the most progressive transfer in table 1.10, 
they are an extremely well-targeted benefit, helping children from low-income 
homes much more than those from high-income homes. Reductions in child 
allowances, and in particular the discontinuation of the progressive part of the 
benefit, would raise overall inequality and relative poverty, potentially substan- 
ti all^.*^ Indeed, the low-income profile of this transfer is so distinct that it is an 
appealing strategy to raise it, in order to counteract the effects of other reduc- 
tions in welfare state benefits on the well-being of children. This was, indeed, 
the strategy in the 1991 tax reform. 
Another important set of changes has been the imposition of fees for public 
services. For instance, the fee for child care has been raised substantially. Local 
governments, which have been forbidden to raise taxes for several years, have 
been forced to cut expenditures or raise fees. Again, however, our sense is that 
these changes are more “tinkering” on the edges rather than a major backing 
away from the welfare state. 
A sanguine reading of  the ongoing changes is that, while they may lower 
the Swedish safety net, that net is so high that it will require something akin 
to  a revolution  to endanger  Sweden’s success  in  eliminating poverty:  Mrs. 
Thatcher cutting the net with a pair of  scissors, not the Economics Commis- 
sion’s  11  3 suggested changes, however one views them. A less sanguine read- 
ing of the changes is that over the long run some developments (lower taxes 
and less statutory vacation time, e.g.) may reduce the twist in labor demand 
toward the less skilled that tied work, a compressed wage structure, and wel- 
fare so closely together in the country. If the 1993 increase in Swedish unem- 
ployment  marks the beginning  of  an era of  relatively  high unemployment, 
moreover, the  welfare  state taxes  and  transfers  that have been  such an  im- 
portant part of  Sweden’s way  of generating equality and eliminating poverty 
29. We note that this result is sensitive to the equivalence scale that we use. While the direction 
of  the effect will be the same with other scales, the magnitude could differ substantively. 73  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
could become so costly that the country will respond with further reductions 
in these programs, with far greater effects on income distribution than those 
that we have documented in this study. 
Appendix 
The standard approach to analyzing how taxes and transfers affect incomes 
compares the distribution of income generated by the “market” with the distri- 
bution after taxes and transfers-that  is, disposable income. In the text, we use 
the standard concept offactor incomes to reflect market incomes. This concept, 
however, has some shortcomings that suggest the value of a more detailed pic- 
ture of how taxes and transfers modify the outcome that the market generates. 
Accordingly, in this appendix, we examine measures of inequality in various 
income measures derived from the Income Distribution Surveys (HINK) of 
Statistics Sweden. 
Factor income (faktorinkomst)  consists of wages and salaries for employed 
workers and the equivalent salary for self-employed workers. It also includes 
income from capital and realized capital gains. It excludes sickness and paren- 
tal allowances in spite of the fact that these benefits are closely tied to previous 
work. The basic components  of  income  from work  are wages and  salaries 
for employed  and  self-employed  individuals  (arbetsinkomst). This includes 
the  closely  work-related  sickness and  parental  leave allowances as well as 
the “stipends” for retraining unemployed workers. Note that these three trans- 
fers are taxable. Total income after deductions for deficits  in some sources 
of  income  (sammanraknad nettoinkomst),  finally,  consists  of  total  taxable 
income from all sources of income, like work (including all taxable transfers), 
income from capital,  income from realized  capital gains, and income from 
own estate and own business. It also includes the closely work-related  trans- 
fers included in retirement pensions  that are  also related  to previous  work 
activity. 
Tables lA.l and 1A.2 present measures of dispersion for the three income 
concepts plus disposable income for selected years from 1975 until  1991. We 
use the same groups as in the text, namely, adults twenty to sixty-four years 
old (in table lA.l) and children through age seventeen (in table 1A.2). We also 
use (as in the main text) the household as the unit of income, the individual as 
the unit of analysis, and the Swedish equivalence scales. 
Factor incomes have the most unequal and erratic pattern. The marked rise 
in inequality that can be found in factor income is not as dramatic in income 
from work and total income. This reflects the importance of sickness and pa- 
rental leave allowances for families in the age groups that we consider. The 74  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table lA.l  Inequality of Various Income Concepts, Adults Twenty to 
Sixty-four  Years 











































































































































Nore; Gini coefficients are given in parentheses.  N.D. = not defined in same manner after tax 
reform. 
"New definition. 
detailed tables from the HINK project reveal that these two transfers, which 
are included in income from work, are higher than income from capital and 
capital gains, which are included in factor income. 
In table  1A.3, we look at income from work in a more detailed way; for 
men, women, and both sexes individually and for families with the individual 
as the unit of analysis. In the latter case, equivalence scales are applied. The 75  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
Table 1A.2  Inequality of Various Income Concepts, Children through 
Seventeen  Years 
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Note: Gini coefficients are given in parentheses. N.D. = not defined in same manner after tax 
reform. 
"New  definition. 
figures reveal an increase in inequality for men irrespective of the measure of 
inequality that is used. The opposite pattern is found for women up to 1990. 
This development for women reflects the shift from part-time to full-time work 
that took place during the 1980s.  Even for women there was, however, a marked 
increase in inequality from 1990 to 1991. For both sexes together there is also 
a downward trend in inequality up to 1990, when there was a marked rise. 76  Anders Bjorklund and Richard B. Freeman 
Table 1A.3  Inequality of Income from Work with the Individual and the Family 
as Units of Income, Adults Twenty to Sixty-four  Years 
Individual 
































































































































Note: Gini coefficients are given in parentheses. Zeroes are zero because we include people with 
no income. N.A. = not available. N.R. = not relevant because base is zero. 
"New definition. 
When we use the family as the unit of income and divide the income from 
work for both  spouses by the equivalent number of  adults in the family, in- 
equality is remarkably stable from 1975 to  1990. In addition, the 90/10 and 
10/50 ratios reveal much more equal distributions for families than for indi- 
viduals. 
Finally, note that tables lA.l and 1A.2 show that disposable income is much 
more equally distributed than total income. Because the main difference be- 77  Generating Equality and Eliminating Poverty, the Swedish Way 
tween total income and disposable income is taxes and nontaxable transfers, 
this illustrates the equalizing effects of these parts of the welfare state. 
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